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WHAT FUTURE FOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE? 
Richard Hyman 
 
 
Abstract 
The systems of industrial relations which were consolidated in most of western Europe after 1945 and 
constructed in the ex-dictatorships of southern Europe in the 1970s, are under attack on many fronts. 
Meanwhile, in most of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where systems of organised industrial 
relations were at best only partially established after the collapse of the Soviet regime, the scope for 
unilateral dominance by (in particular foreign-owned) employers has been further enlarged. It is also 
clear that the European Union (EU), far from acting as a force for harmonisation of regulatory 
standards and a strengthening of the ‘social dimension’ of employment regulation, is encouraging the 
erosion of nationally based employment protections and provoking a growing divergence of 
outcomes. However, the trends are contradictory and uneven. In this contribution I discuss a number 
of key similarities and differences across the countries of Europe, and end by considering whether 
progressive alternatives still exist. 
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Introduction 
 
As is clear from the other contributions to this special issue, the systems of industrial relations 
consolidated in most of western Europe after 1945 and constructed in the ex-dictatorships of southern 
Europe in the 1970s, are under attack on many fronts. Meanwhile, in most of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), where systems of organised industrial relations were at best only partially established 
after the collapse of the Soviet regime, the scope for unilateral dominance by (in particular foreign-
owned) employers has been further enlarged. It is also clear that the European Union (EU), far from 
acting as a force for harmonisation of regulatory standards and a strengthening of the ‘social 
dimension’ of employment regulation, is encouraging the erosion of nationally based employment 
protections and provoking a growing divergence of outcomes. 
 In the following discussion I first discuss the transformations within global capitalism which 
everywhere have threatened established systems of institutionalised industrial relations. I then turn to 
the nationally specific dynamics which have resulted in growing diversity across Europe: what 
Lehndorff (2015a) terms ‘divisive integration’. I end by considering what progressive options remain.  
 
 
The New ‘Great Transformation’ 
 
Karl Polanyi (1944), writing three-quarters of a century ago, interpreted the development of capitalist 
economies as the outcome of a ‘double movement’. The first, in the nineteenth century, involved the 
imposition of ‘free’ markets (though the whole idea of free markets is an oxymoron, since all markets 
are social and political constructs). The damaging social effects of this process, in particular those 
transforming labour into a ‘fictitious commodity’ to be hired and fired at will, provoked a counter-
movement. Hence the struggles in the twentieth century for social, industrial and economic 
democracy represented a countervailing process to impose some constraint on the disruptive social 
consequences of market liberalism. Markets became ‘embedded’ in a systematic regulatory web.  
 Polanyi anticipated a parallel reaction to the excesses of market-making at the international 
level: renewed state regulation of the domestic economy linked to a retreat from ‘capitalist 
internationalism’. What however occurred was a new form of international regime, involving a 
bounded liberalisation of external trade, but linked to Keynesian economic management and a partial 
decommodification of labour at national level. ‘The principles of multilateralism and tariff reductions 
were affirmed, but so were safeguards, exemptions, exceptions, and restrictions – all designed to 
protect the balance of payments and a variety of domestic social policies’ (Ruggie, 1982: 381).  
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 The post-war social compromise was inherently ambiguous and unstable, for three main 
reasons. First, it reflected a specific, historically contingent balance of class forces, and one largely 
confined to ‘advanced’ economies. Second, it assumed different forms cross-nationally, but in all 
cases involved an accommodation between national labour movements, employers who were 
primarily national in terms of corporate ownership and production strategies, and governments which 
were to a large degree autonomous in social and economic policy: an outcome of the bounded 
character of economic internationalisation which Ruggie described. Third, the existence of an 
alternative socio-economic model to the East – however deformed and repressive – imposed a degree 
of self-restraint on capitalist aggression. 
 These three preconditions no longer apply. What has developed in recent decades has been 
analysed by McMurtry (1998) as the ‘cancer stage of capitalism’. Polyani (1944: 73) described 
labour, land and money as ‘fictitious commodities’ because while they were all subject to market 
forces, unlike real commodities they were not produced for sale on the market. ‘To allow the market 
mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, 
even of the amount and use of their purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society.’ 
Certainly the post-war compromises imposed firm limits on the commodification of labour, land and 
money; but Polanyi’s analysis was remarkably prescient. What has now occurred is the systematic 
weakening and removal of the social constraints on the destructive dynamic of commodification: a 
‘carcinogenic mutation’ which has released the pathological potential which capitalist economies 
always contained (McMurtry, 1998: 127-128). 
 The cancer stage of capitalism is linked as both cause and effect to the erosion of the three 
preconditions of post-war social compromises. First, globalisation – of which European economic 
integration is one important element – has removed the dominant capitalist agglomerations from 
national control. There are many ways of conceptualising the historical development of globalisation, 
including its technological foundations and its geographical scope. What we would highlight are the 
changes in its core dynamic. Its earliest forms involved international movements of commodities: raw 
materials, manufactured products but also labour (including slave and semi-slave labour, as Nelson 
Lichtenstein reminds us). The mid-twentieth century saw a qualitative shift to the dominant role of 
multinational corporations and the development of what may best be called global surplus value 
chains, in which corporate strategists subject actual producers to constant pressures to cut costs, 
creating new forms of insecurity. In the third, most recent phase, finance capital intensifies the 
dynamic of commodification. 
 Financialisation is the second key transformation. Liberalisation of financial markets has 
spawned an array of exotic fictitious commodities which Polanyi could never have imagined: 
derivatives, secondary markets, hedge funds, private equity, leveraged buy-outs, credit default 
swaps.... It is now possible, and indeed more effective, to generate a surplus without producing value: 
money can be expanded without the production of commodities as traditionally understood. 
Corporations have themselves been transformed into commodities, increasingly bought and sold, 
creating new modes of insecurity: for growing numbers of workers (and their unions), it is no longer 
even clear who is the employer (Standing, 2011: 35).  
 The third transformation involves the reconfiguration of the role of the state. The post-war 
compromises involved the state in multiple ways. Particularly but not exclusively in Europe, 
legislation created a web of individual employment rights, and also buttressed collective 
representation of worker interests through trade unions and works councils. Welfare regimes were 
central to Polanyi’s ‘double movement’. Macroeconomic regulation on Keynesian lines sustained 
near-full employment. Governments themselves became major employers, typically committed to 
supporting high labour standards. But in recent decades, neoliberal globalisation has provided an alibi 
for anti-social policies by governments that insist that there is no alternative to submission to 
international markets (Weiss, 1998). On the one hand, government policies have been aimed at 
‘rolling back the state’, and restricting social protections to those that can be justified on grounds of 
productivity and competitiveness; on the other, new and repressive forms of intervention have been 
required to impose the sway of market forces. The European Union (EU), once often viewed as a 
defender of decommodification, has become one of the key drivers of this process: its ‘new economic 
governance’ increasingly targets social welfare and employment protection; while the austerity 
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packages imposed on the ‘programme’ countries by the Troika of European Commission, European 
Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund have coercively imposed escalating insecurity. 
 National economies and national labour markets are thus increasingly disembedded from 
effective social regulation; and the beneficiaries of financialised ‘shareholder value’ capitalism have 
little interest in maintaining historic compromises. Keynesian macroeconomic management, one of 
the key foundations of the postwar settlement, presupposed the economic governance capacity of the 
nation-state; macroeconomic demand management has now been subordinated to the assumed 
inevitability of national ‘competitiveness’. Where significant productive and infrastructural assets 
were in public hands, in most countries these have now been largely privatized. 
 Thus the balance of class forces has shifted radically. These trends can be understood, within 
Polanyi’s framework, as a counter-counter-movement, a third phase involving the deliberate 
unravelling of the regulatory web constructed in previous decades. The norm of insecurity, widely 
believed to have been overcome in the mid-twentieth century, is increasingly re-imposed. The crisis 
which began in 2007-08 brought a rapid increase in unemployment, which in many countries persists. 
For many, and in some countries most new labour market entrants the only available employment 
opportunities are precarious: short-term contracts, bogus self-employment, agency work zero hours 
contracts.... What was once considered ‘atypical’ employment is now increasingly typical.  
 The growth of a new ‘reserve army of labour’ combines with the longer-term trend to ‘post-
Fordism’ – the shift from industry to services and, within manufacturing, the contracting out of 
functions and the subdivision of corporate structures – to bring a proliferation of smaller employing 
units. This fragmentation of occupational status and identity intensifies competition within the 
working class and presents major obstacles to collective solidarity. Hence it is no surprise that trade 
union membership, as a proportion of the labour force, is almost universally in decline, as able 1 
indicates. This trend, as Peters (2011) shows, can be attributed to the impact of the global 
financialisation of capitalism. In most of western Europe, collective bargaining coverage remains 
stable – though this is certainly not true of Britain, nor indeed of Germany – but its content has often 
been hollowed out through diverse forms of decentralization and concession bargaining.  
For the past two or three decades, the wage share in national income has everywhere declined, 
and inequality has increased, in some countries dramatically. Even before the recent (and current) 
crisis, government budgets had been squeezed, to an important extent through a competitive reduction 
in corporation tax in an attempt to avoid capital flight: in consequence, the welfare state has been cut 
back, transformed increasingly into a minimal safety net. Even this diminished level of social 
protection is under threat as part of the current austerity drive, given an explicitly coercive character 
by the neoliberal rulers of the EU and the majority of member states.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
‘Divisive Integration’ 
 
It has long been customary to identify a limited number of industrial relations patterns in Western 
Europe: the Nordic countries with strong traditions of labour market regulation based primarily on 
exceptionally strong central organisations of unions and employers, buttressed by highly developed 
welfare states and an egalitarian ethos; a ‘central’ model comprising Germany, Austria and the 
Benelux countries, with strong but less encompassing collective institutions, a ‘southern’ model with 
less organisational capacity among the collective organisations of capital and labour, and far greater 
dependence on the state as a regulatory mechanism; and as an outlier, the Anglophone countries of 
Ireland and the UK with more weakly regulated labour markets (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 
2013). Since EU enlargement in 2004, the CEE countries are often seen as a fifth, ‘transitional’ model 
(but transitional to what?), with particularly weakly developed collective institutions among the 
labour market actors and with governments torn between the pursuit of deregulated labour markets to 
enhance national competitiveness and anxiety to maintain social protection to avoid social protest and 
support the electoral base of the governing parties. Bohle and Greskovits (2007) have also suggested 
that the diversity among CEE countries necessitates further differentiation among country types: 
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neoliberalism in the Baltic states, ‘embedded neoliberalism’ (marketisation to some extent constrained 
by state regulation and social protection) in most countries, neocorporatism in Slovenia. 
 In recent years, such differences have increased. ‘The cleavages between unions within the 
groups of countries are deepening.... The country clusters frequently used in comparative trade union 
analyses make less sense today’ (Lehndorff et al. 2017: 9, 24). This need not mean that the familiar 
groupings of European industrial relations systems have lost heuristic utility. However, any attempt to 
systematise the patterns of industrial relations across Europe has become increasingly complicated 
because of the uneven impact of the crisis and subsequent EU initiatives to discipline national 
governments. Certainly, the ‘southern’ countries have been particularly severely affected in this 
respect; but so have several (though by no means all) CEE countries. Ireland stands out– with its US-
style housing bubble and deregulated financial sector – as the first victim of the Troika process; the 
cost of rescuing failed banks more than doubled government debt between 2008 and 2010. Yet in 
terms of actual labour market outcomes, as Table 2 indicates, in 2012 (the peak of the crisis for most 
countries) there were still significant similarities within country groups. 
 As Lehndorff (2015b) documents, the incremental shift of EU policy towards neoliberalism has 
created a ‘competition Union’; and any competition results in both winners and losers. This dynamic 
is intensified for members of the eurozone, since Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
complemented the single market with a single currency but without an architecture for transfers 
between countries (as between regions in national political economies) with unequal competitive 
capacity. With any capacity to revalue national currencies removed, governments facing trade 
imbalances were obliged to resort to ‘internal devaluation’: in other words, cutting the real value of 
wages and social benefits. While the centrifugal dynamic among member states was evident from the 
outset of EMU, it was greatly intensified by the combined effects of the financial crisis, which 
imposed immense costs on some governments but not others in order to bail out failed banks, and the 
deflationary impact of the ‘new European economic governance’ (NEEG), particularly severe in the 
case of those countries receiving bail-out packages. Austerity became ‘the hard core of EU crisis 
policy’ (Lehndorff 2015b: 13). The deflationary squeeze on already struggling economies intensified 
unemployment and reduced tax revenues, accentuating the debt problem and hence escalating the 
vicious spiral, resulting in ‘a continent drifting apart’ (Lehndorff 2015b: 19). 
 This variable geometry is evident from the national accounts presented in earlier contributions. 
These eight cases can be supplemented by a number of other recent multi-country studies. Lehndorff 
(2015a) surveys the uneven impact of imposed austerity across Europe, with specific analyses of 
Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland, Germany, France, Austria, the UK, Hungary and Sweden. Van Gyes and 
Schulten (2015) explore how the NEEG has affected wage bargaining at national level, with 
comparative studies of Italy, Portugal and Spain, the four Nordic countries, Hungary, Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic, and a separate study of the UK. Collective bargaining in the context of austerity and 
the NEEG is also the focus of Koukiadi et al. (2016), with studies of the manufacturing sector in 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain. Lehndorff et al. (2017) examine the 
impact of the crisis on trade unions, covering France, Spain, Italy, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Austria, 
Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden. ‘Internal devaluation’ is the focus of the studies in 
Myant et al. (2016) examining the cases of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Germany, the UK and 
Poland. While all these works are multi-authored edited collections, one may also note the book of 
Baccaro and Howell (2017), who discuss different dynamics towards neoliberalism across western 
Europe, with specific accounts of the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden. Among a range of 
journal articles, one may also note the comparison by Meardi (2013) of Germany, France, the UK, 
Italy, Spain and Poland, and his subsequent analysis (2014) of the last three of these; the more 
encompassing study by Visser (2016) of trends in the coverage and character of collective bargaining 
in 38 OECD and EU countries; and the attempt by Marginson (2016) to theorise different modes of 
institutional change under the impact of economic globalisation. 
 The challenges to established industrial relations processes involve an interaction between 
structural, to a large extent transnational forces, and the strategies of ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ 
(Crouch 2005) at national level. The relative importance of internal and external drivers of change, 
and the degree to which these threaten the regulatory capacity of traditional institutional 
arrangements, entail major cross-national variations in the experience of the crisis years. To 
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systematise this diversity, I identify four main patterns, though the boundaries between these are 
relatively imprecise. 
 At one extreme are countries subject to externally imposed austerity and more specific 
requirements to weaken employment protection legislation, liberalise precarious contracts, 
decentralise collective bargaining, remove the priority of higher-level over lower-level agreements, 
weaken or abolish extension mechanisms and reduce minimum wages. Of the eight countries 
discussed by previous authors, Spain most clearly fits this category, and to some degree Romania. 
However, the most radical cases of externally imposed demolition of worker protections are Greece 
and Portugal, both subject to the severe constraints of ‘Memoranda of Understanding’ with the Troika 
as conditions for debt relief. To some extent, developments in Romania and Slovenia can be 
interpreted in the same terms; in particular, the elimination of many of the ‘corporatist’ characteristics 
established after Slovenian independence. Ireland was also subject to analogous constraints from the 
Troika, though its already weakly institutionalised industrial relations mechanisms were less radically 
transformed. 
 This category merges into a second, where less coercive external pressures reinforced already 
strong domestic moves to liberalisation. Here, the UK is the exemplary case: the financial crisis, and 
the subsequent government bail-out of failed banks, indeed substantially increased public debt; but the 
radical austerity measures imposed after the 2010 election were largely the reflection of a domestic 
political agenda. Moreover, the new legislative attacks on trade unions were purely an exercise in 
political vindictiveness. The cases of Italy and France present some similarities. In the former case, 
the ‘secret letter’ sent by the European Central Bank in 2011, when a default on government debt 
seemed possible, demanded radical changes in labour law and collective bargaining practices. The 
resulting changes, as Meardi (2012: 75) comments in his comparison of Spain and Italy, ‘would not 
have been thinkable without direct institutional intervention from the EU. In few months, the 
European Commission and the ECB achieved what Spanish and Italian employers and rightwing 
government had not even dared to ask. Labour resistance, which had previously had some success, is 
now in a weaker position when fighting a more elusive opponent, uninterested in local political 
exchange and unaﬀected by general strikes.’ Nevertheless, liberalisation of employment protection 
and collective bargaining was strongly embraced by both the Monti and Renzi governments, with the 
‘Jobs Act’ which the latter pressed though being presented as  a means to remedy labour market 
failing deemed responsible for high youth unemployment. Likewise, Rehfeldt in his article attributes 
the El Khomri law of 2016 to the fact that France was at risk of EU sanctions for ‘excessive debt’ and 
was under pressure from the Commission to cut labour costs and facilitate company-level derogations 
from sectoral collective agreements. Yet at the same time, this agenda was enthusiastically embraced 
by ‘modernisers’ within the Hollande government, and became central to the electoral programme of 
Macron in 2017. One could also argue that in both Slovenia and Romania, though external pressure 
was also decisive, deregulation and austerity measures were facilitated by powerful domestic actors. 
 As a third category, the majority of CEE countries, not yet fully integrated into financialised 
global capitalism and hence less exposed to the financial crisis (the Baltic states were obvious 
exceptions), were less severely affected than were many economies in the west. As Mrozowicki and 
Czarzasty argue in their account of Polish developments, the ‘embedded neoliberalism’ of the 
Visegrád countries has involved, as Bohle and Greskovits (2012) put it, ‘a ‘permanent search for 
compromises between market transformation and social cohesion’. The collective industrial relations 
actors are in general weak, but statutory individual employment protection is relatively strong. Within 
this context, developments during the past decade have largely reflected domestic political dynamics, 
with often authoritarian governments anxious to sustain populist support and hence reluctant to 
threaten workers’ material conditions. 
 The fourth group, the Nordic  and ‘central’ countries, includes the main winners from the 
eurozone and the ‘competition Union’. Here, there was relatively little external pressure to transform 
industrial relations during the crisis, and the pressures for weakening of employment protection and 
decentralisation of collective bargaining have been primarily domestic. In these countries, it is a 
matter of debate how far recent changes have undermined the postwar industrial relations architecture. 
Müller-Jentsch concludes his contribution by arguing that ‘there has been no radical break with the 
main institutions and structures whose history can be traced back to the Weimar Republic. Collective 
bargaining autonomy and co-determination have proved to be stable yet flexible institutions at the 
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core of the system.’ Yet as he also notes, ‘pessimists’ suggest that incremental erosion may have 
reached a stage where disintegration may be difficult to avoid. In the Danish case, Knudsen and Lind 
note that the traditional ‘voluntarist’ model of Nordic employment regulation is challenged by 
growing competition within the EU and by the threat of social dumping (reinforced by CJEU rulings 
such as the Laval judgment), and by a more general shift in the balance of power towards employers; 
but they conclude by stressing the continuity of the system. Again, there are more pessimistic 
readings, in particular the account of Sweden by Baccaro and Howell (2017). In the case of this fourth 
group, stability and continuity must be read comparatively: as against the coercive destruction of 
regulatory institutions elsewhere in Europe, erosion is indeed limited. Whether vulnerability is 
increasing in these countries too remains a serious question. 
 
 
What Is to Be Done? 
 
Hence to differing degrees, the balance of class forces in Europe has shifted dramatically towards 
employers, and capital has increasingly escaped the constraints painfully constructed in previous 
decades, while the dominant approach of the EU is to reinforce rather than to regulate this trend. Is the 
juggernaut of capital now irresistible? The starting point for any sober assessment of alternative 
trajectories is that structural forces are powerful, but that agency is also important. To explore the 
tension between structure and agency we need to focus on social relations. These relations are in turn 
always uneven and contradictory, creating openness to historical contingency, since material contexts 
impose constraints but also create opportunities. The organisational capacities and strategic 
competence of the key actors shape the outcomes, perhaps producing the difference between success 
and failure.  
 The cross-national differences in the dynamics of institutional change and regulatory 
reconfiguration can be understood in terms of the concept of variable geometry. Any discussion of 
possibilities for resistance to attacks on workers’ conditions and the rights of collective organisation 
needs to address in particular three aspects of unevenness: the relationship between the global and the 
local; that between trade unions and other vectors of protest; and the challenge of crafting solidarity 
from diversity. To fight back against the odds requires strategic imagination, new alliances and 
transnational learning and solidarity. 
 Globalisation is by definition supranational; the modalities of resistance are predominantly 
national, or indeed sub-national. This variable geometry in part reflects national differences in 
opportunity structures, in part diverse historical traditions and repertoires of contention (Tilly, 2006). 
But while resistance to globalised insecurity occurs in nationally specific contexts, its focus must 
unavoidably be international. This is one of the central arguments developed in recent decades by the 
alter-globalisation movements. Trade unionisms have their own, more institutionalised international 
structures, but internationalism is far less embedded in everyday trade union action. And 
internationalism means little if it is purely a concern of ‘international experts’: it must be built into the 
routine discourse and practice of labour movements. In this respect, what Tarrow (2006) calls ‘the 
new transnational activism’, often orchestrated by what he terms ‘rooted cosmopolitans’ who are 
locally embedded but globally oriented and connected, may represent a more agile form of cross-
national coordination. The fact that labour in some countries has (as yet) been little affected by the 
crisis, while the impact in others has been devastating, obviously intensifies the obstacles to 
transnational solidarity. 
 There is a long history of mutual suspicion between trade unions and more spontaneous, often 
activist-led social movements and NGOs; yet neither form of resistance can succeed alone. Almost 
everywhere, unions have lost power resources. Structural power is severely weakened by 
globalisation, and associational power has declined with falling membership density. In much of 
western Europe, institutional power remains superficially robust, which can induce complacency, as 
was long the case with German unions; but without other supports, institutional status can be fragile 
(Hassel, 2007). Unions are almost universally weak among the younger workers who, as shown 
earlier, have been particularly seriously affected by the erosion of labour market security. Many of the 
victims of insecurity see trade unions as part of the problem. Yet if protests against austerity, 
unemployment and precarious work have commonly been led by more radical social movements, their 
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very spontaneity obstructs sustained resistance; and in some cases they become captured by highly 
politicised ‘orchestrators’. Organisational divisions and rivalries can seriously weaken the capacity for 
effective action. Where these divisions are transcended, important synergies can be created between 
the different types of collective actor. As Ibsen and Tapia (2017) show, there is growing evidence of 
successful attempts by unions to build ‘coalitional power’ with other social movements.  
 Globalised ‘neo-entrepreneurial’ capitalism, as Jenkins and Leicht (1997: 379) term it, 
‘produces a more fragmented labor market as it also shrinks the number of established places for 
members of the working class’. Different social and economic groups have been affected in 
significantly different ways by crisis and austerity, and these differences can create new divisions and 
antagonisms, not the supposed unity of the ‘99%’. A sense of mutuality, of a common fate and 
common interests, is not objectively given but is a task requiring a difficult struggle. Unity cannot be 
built by a linguistic sleight-of-hand – ‘the people united’ – but requires sustained dialogue and debate, 
otherwise the interests of the weakest are easily submerged beneath a spurious assumption of 
commonality. 
 The construction of solidarities at both national and international levels involves vital cognitive 
and discursive elements. In this context, della Porta (2012: 276) notes that ‘the proposals and practices 
of the indignados and occupying movement – as well as those spread in and by the Arab Spring – 
resonate in fact with (more traditional) participatory visions, but also with new deliberative 
conceptions that underline the importance of creating multiple public spaces, egalitarian but plural’. 
For Melucci (1989), the creation of a collective identity is a process of negotiation over time which 
contains three aspects: shaping a cognitive framework within which the environment is understood 
and goals and tactics are formulated; fostering social relationships among participants; and 
stimulating an emotional dynamic among those involved. Such processes are somewhat alien to most 
trade unionisms (or have been lost over time), but have been vital for many of the ‘new’ social 
movements. Hence developing synergies between the organisational capacity of the ‘old’ and the 
imaginative spontaneity of the ‘new’, drawing on the strengths of each, is an important means to build 
effective resistance to the re-commodification of labour. 
 It is necessary to address the systemic nature of the crisis, but in comprehensible terms. 
Movements of resistance must embrace the principle that ‘capitalism is the reality, but not our 
perspective’ (Urban, 2014: 41). To be effective, different modes of resistance must be mutually 
supportive, and above all must be informed by a vision of an alternative. The challenge, as always for 
those pursuing a different socio-economic order, is to formulate alternatives which are concrete, 
comprehensible and attractive. The issue is partly one of language, to simplify without trivialising; but 
it is also to provide concrete examples of economic solidarity outside the market. And indeed, a key 
element in a number of the protests in the worst affected countries – notably in Spain and in Greece – 
has been the collective provision and exchange of food, health care and other services, bypassing the 
money economy, and this has certainly helped enthuse and empower many of those worst affected by 
insecurity and austerity. 
 Those who drive neoliberal globalisation, the hegemony of finance capital and the politics of 
insecurity and austerity rely on the demoralisation of their victims. Resistance may well draw its 
inspiration from anger, but to be translated into constructive action it requires self-confidence in the 
capacity to initiate change. In dark times, to build hope is perhaps the most difficult challenge, and not 
only because hopes can so easily be disappointed. But fatalism and surrender should not be the only 
options. Another world – and another Europe – is possible. 
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Table 1. Trade Union Density and Collective Bargaining Coverage 
 
  Union Density                         Bargaining Coverage 
  
 1980 1990 2000 2014
a
  1980 1990 2000 2014
 a
 
FI 69 73 75 69  77 81 86 93 
DK 79 75 74 67  72 69 80 84 
SE 78 82 80 67  85 88 91 89 
BE 54 54 49 55  97 96 96 96 
NO 58 59 54 52  70 70 72 67 
IT 48 39 35 37  85 83 80 80 
IE 64 57 40 34  64 60 55 41 
AT 57 47 37 27  95 99 99 98 
UK 51 39 30 26  70 54 36 30 
SI  69 42 21   100    100 65                                                                                                                                                                            
EL  39 34 22   65 65 42 
RO    100 80 40 20     35 
BG 98 81 28 18    40 29 
DE 35 31 25 18  78 72 64 58 
NL 35 24 23 18  79 82 86 85 
PT 55 28 22 19  70 99 92 73 
ES 19 13 17 17  76 82 83 78 
CH 28 28 23 16  48 44 42 49 
CZ   27 13    41 47 
SK   32 13    51 25 
LV   26 13    18 15 
PL 65 37 17 13    25 15 
HU 94 83 22 11    47 23 
LT   17   9     15 10 
FR 18 10   8   8  85 92 95 98 
EE  94 15   7     29 23 
a
 For some countries, 2013 
Source: ICTWSS database, based on national sources (Visser 2015)  
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Table 2. Labour Market Indicators, 2012, by country groups 
 
  Population  Employment  Unemployment Fixed-term  Part-time  
  (million)  rate 15-64 (%)  (%)   (%)   (%) 
All Female  All 15-24 All 15-24 All Female 
 
DK   5.5   73 70     8 14    9 21  25 36 
FI   5.3   69 68     8 19  16 41  14 19 
NO   4.8   76 74     3   9    8 24  27 42 
SE   9.3   74 72     8 24  16 57  25 39 
 
AT   8.4   73 67     4   9    9 36  25 44 
BE 11.1   62 57     8 20    8 31  25 44 
CH   7.7   79 74     4   8  13 53  35 60 
DE 82.0   73 68     6   8  14 53
a
  26 45 
NL 16.5   75 70     5 10  20 51  49
b
 77
a
 
 
EL 11.2   51 42   24 35  10 26    8 12 
ES 46.2   55 51   25 53  24 65  15 24 
FR 62.5   64 60   10 24  15 57  18 30 
IT 60.0   57 47   11 35  14 53  17 31 
PT 10.6   62 59   16 38  21 56  11 14 
 
IE   4.5   59 55   15 30  10 35  24 35 
UK 62.0   70 65     8 21    6 15  26 42 
 
EE   1.3   67 65   10 21    4 13    9 13 
LT   2.2   62 62   13 26    3   9    9 11 
LV   3.2   63 62   15 28    5 10    9 11 
BG   7.5   59 56   12 28    5   7    2   3 
RO 20.4   60 53     7 23    2   6    9 10 
 
CZ 10.4   67 58     7 20    9 27    5   9 
HU 10.0   57 52   11 28    9 22    7   9 
PL 38.1   60 53   10 27  27 66    7 11 
SK   5.4   60 53   14 34    7 19    4   6 
 
SI   2.0   64 61     9 21  17 72    9 12 
 
a  
Note that in DE, this figure is inflated by the high proportion of apprentices who are categorised as fixed-
term. 
b
 In NL, part-time status is defined as working under 35 hours a week; elsewhere, it is based on employees’ 
self-definition  
Source: eurostat 
 
